Does health insurance reduce out-of-pocket expenditure? Heterogeneity among China's middle-aged and elderly by Zhang, Anwen et al.
  
 
 
 
 
Zhang, A., Nikoloski, Z. and Mossialos, E. (2017) Does health insurance reduce out-of-
pocket expenditure? Heterogeneity among China's middle-aged and elderly. Social 
Science and Medicine, 190, pp. 11-19. 
 
   
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 
advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/187801/  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 6 June 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
Does health insurance reduce out-of-pocket
expenditure? Heterogeneity among China’s
middle-aged and elderly∗
Anwen Zhang†a, Zlatko Nikoloskia, and Elias Mossialosa
a
Department of Health Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science,
London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
August 2017
∗We thank Jia Hu and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions
that helped us improve this article. We thank the China Center for Economic Research
(CCER) at Peking University for making the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal
Study (CHARLS) data available. All errors are our own.
†Corresponding author. Email : a.zhang6@lse.ac.uk
Abstract
China’s recent healthcare reforms aim to provide fair and afford-
able health services for its huge population. In this paper, we inves-
tigate the association between China’s health insurance and out-of-
pocket (OOP) healthcare expenditure. We further explore the het-
erogeneity in this association. Using data of 32,387 middle-aged and
elderly individuals drawn from the 2011 and 2013 waves of China
Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), we report five
findings. First, having health insurance increases the likelihood of
utilizing healthcare and reduces inpatient OOP expenditure. Second,
healthcare benefits are distributed unevenly: while low- and medium-
income individuals are the main beneficiaries with reduced OOP ex-
penditure, those faced with very high medical bills are still at risk,
owing to limited and shallow coverage in certain aspects. Third, ru-
ral migrants hardly benefit from having health insurance, suggesting
that institutional barriers are still in place. Fourth, health insurance
does not increase patient visits to primary care facilities; hospitals are
still the main provider of healthcare. Nonetheless, there is some evi-
dence that patients shift from higher-tier to lower-tier hospitals. Last,
OOP spending on pharmaceuticals is reduced for inpatient care but
not for outpatient care, suggesting that people rely on inpatient care
to obtain reimbursable drugs, putting further pressure on the already
overcrowded hospitals. Our findings suggest that China’s health in-
surance system has been effective in boosting healthcare utilization
and lowering OOP hospitalization expenditure, but there still remain
challenges due to the less generous rural scheme, shallow outpatient
care coverage, lack of insurance portability, and an underdeveloped
primary healthcare system.
Key words: China; health insurance; healthcare utilization; out-of-
pocket expenditure; migrant
1 Introduction
China’s market liberalization since 1978 has brought about remarkable eco-
nomic growth. Meanwhile, it also dismantled the previous publicly funded
healthcare system, leading to a rapid increase in out-of-pocket (OOP) spend-
ing, with its share in total health expenditure rising from 20% in 1978 to
nearly 60% in 2002 (MOH, 2006). To tackle the poor access to health-
care and medical impoverishment, China has launched a series of healthcare
reforms since the late 1990s, and managed to achieve near-universal health
insurance coverage by 2011 (Chen, 2009; Cheng, 2012). While this is remark-
able progress, it remains unclear as to how effective China’s health insurance
schemes have been in reducing the financial burden of the world’s largest
population.
Existing evidence on the link between China’s health insurance and OOP
expenditure is mixed. In a review of empirical research on China’s health
system, Wagstaff et al. (2009b) suggest that there is no clear association
between insurance and OOP spending under the pre-2003 health system.
Using data from two national surveys and one provincial household survey,
Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) find the “curious case” of health insurance
increasing the risk of high and catastrophic spending in China. This is likely
due to healthcare users switching to more costly and higher-level providers, as
well as higher utilization rates among the insured (Jung and Streeter, 2015).
Some studies focusing on specific health insurance programs find little or no
effect of reducing financial risks (Hou et al., 2014; Lei and Lin, 2009; Li and
Zhang, 2013; Meng et al., 2012; Wagstaff et al., 2009a; Yip and Hsiao, 2009),
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while others arrive at the opposite conclusion (Jung and Streeter, 2015; Meng
et al., 2004), due to differences in data sources and methodologies used.
While much work has gone into the overall effect of health insurance on
healthcare utilization and OOP financial burden, there is not much evidence
on the distributional effects. In their evaluation of China’s new rural health
insurance scheme, Wagstaff et al. (2009a) find heterogeneity across income
groups, with the poor more likely to use lower-level than higher-level facil-
ities, and thus less upward pressure on their OOP spending. A few studies
using small-scale data find that health insurance improves equity in health-
care access and eases the OOP financial burden. For instance, Liu et al.
(2002) find a bigger increase in outpatient care utilization among lower so-
cioeconomic groups, while Liu and Zhao (2006) find disadvantaged groups
favored in the redistribution of OOP expenditure.
Few studies have examined how health insurance affects rural migrants, a
subpopulation faced with lower immunization rates, higher infectious disease
rates, more occupational health problems, higher maternal mortality rates,
and higher healthcare cost (Barber and Yao, 2010; Herd et al., 2010; Hesketh
et al., 2008; Hu et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2010). Due to the hukou system,
China’s household registration system which ties certain local social welfare
benefits to the place of hukou registration (usually the place of birth), mi-
grants often do not have access to subsidized local healthcare at the place
where they work and live. Qin et al. (2014), using data from a household
survey covering nine cities in 2007 and 2010, find China’s health insurance
schemes are ineffective in alleviating the financial burden of healthcare or
promoting the use of formal medical facilities among migrant workers. Using
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data from a telephone survey, Zhao et al. (2014b) find no association between
health insurance and gross or OOP medical cost.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the association be-
tween China’s health insurance schemes and individual OOP expenditure as
well as healthcare utilization, and further explore the heterogeneity in this
association. We make a number of contributions to the literature. First,
we examine in detail whether and how insurance is associated with health-
care utilization and OOP spending in different ways across socioeconomic
groups, and how individuals incurring different levels of health expenditure
are affected differently. Second, we specifically consider rural migrants, and
investigate whether migrants and local residents derive different benefits from
health insurance. Third, we examine whether health insurance has led pa-
tients to seek basic care from primary care facilities. Fourth, we also in-
vestigate the relationship between health insurance and pharmaceutical and
non-pharmaceutical spending. Lastly, we apply these analyses to a recent
dataset of the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS)
for 2011 and 2013; CHARLS is a biennial survey of a nationally represen-
tative sample of the middle-aged and elderly in China. This new dataset
enables us to examine the most recent progress in China’s health insurance
schemes and their impact at a national level.
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2 China’s Health Insurance Schemes
2.1 Institutional Background
China’s current health insurance system consists of three main schemes, the
Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI), the New Cooperative
Medical Scheme (NCMS), and the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance
(URBMI), each intended for a certain population group. A brief description
of these three schemes is provided in Online Appendix Table A1. See Meng
et al. (2015) and Yip et al. (2012) for more details.
UEBMI, established in 1998, provides health insurance to formal-sector
urban employees and retirees. It is managed by cities/municipalities and
financed by premium contributions from employers’ payroll tax (6% of em-
ployees’ wages) and employees’ wages (2% wages). Retirees’ premiums are
fully borne by employers. Outpatient and inpatient healthcare expenditures
are managed in two separate accounts. 4.2% of the contribution goes to a
medical savings account (MSA), which is used to cover outpatient services
until it is exhausted, after which the enrollees will have to pay from their
pocket; the rest of the funds (3.8% wages) go to a social risk pool (SRP), to
cover inpatient services.
NCMS is a voluntary scheme, first rolled out in 2003 in a few provinces,
and quickly expanded to the whole country. Enrollment is at the household
level to alleviate adverse selection into the scheme. The scheme is operated at
the county level, and subsidized by the central and county governments. This
replaces an old cooperative scheme that operated at the village or township
level, providing a larger risk pool and economies of scale in organization and
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management (Wagstaff and Yu, 2007). The premium and subsidy were set at
very low levels (at 10 RMB or 2 USD individual contribution and 20 RMB or
3 USD subsidy) at the start of the scheme, but both gradually increased over
time. By 2010, the average total premium had risen to 160 RMB (25 USD).
The NCMS prioritizes inpatient services, with outpatient expenses covered
only in some counties.
URBMI is intended to cover unemployed urban residents (including stu-
dents and children), the self-employed, and employees in informal sectors,
who are not eligible under UEBMI or NCMS. Launched in 2008, it is also
a subsidized program, partly funded by local and central governments, and
partly funded by individual contribution. Like NCMS, the URBMI also fo-
cuses on inpatient services, with outpatient coverage available only in some
counties.
No comprehensive or universal medical coverage scheme targets migrants
specifically at the national level. As the three main insurance schemes are
managed by local governments, they are regionally segregated and often tied
with the local hukou, and hence migrants are generally not eligible, except
that URBMI is offered to migrants in some cities (Yip et al., 2012). As the
majority of migrants move from rural to urban areas, with hukou registered
at their home county, many migrants are eligible for enrollment in NCMS
at their home county but not at their place of residence. Binding health
insurance to the local hukou restricts the reimbursement for health services at
non-local facilities and makes it difficult to obtain. This regional segregation
of the health insurance system poses a significant institutional barrier to
migrants receiving healthcare services at their place of residence rather than
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at their hometown.
2.2 Hypothesis Development
From the description above, China’s health insurance schemes are mainly
intended to provide financial protection for inpatient OOP spending, while
outpatient services have only limited coverage or are not covered at all.
All three insurance schemes feature a reimbursement cap, which is roughly
six times the average local individual income. The reimbursement rates range
from 44% to 68%, considering the deductibles, copayments, and ceilings.
Given the shallow depth of coverage and low reimbursement rates, health in-
surances seem to offer better protection for individuals with relatively lower,
than for those with higher, healthcare expenditure. From a demand per-
spective, low- and medium-income individuals, who are more likely to in-
cur lower healthcare expenditures (for instance, by purchasing generic drugs
rather than patented ones), may benefit from health insurance through lower
OOP spending. Considering the potential heterogeneity across the income
distribution, we develop the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Health insurance is associated with lower OOP spending
(in both inpatient and outpatient services), with differential effects across
income groups.
The three insurance schemes are managed by the city/municipality or
county government, mainly to serve their local residents. Migrants are gen-
erally not categorized as “local residents” even though they live and work in
the same municipality or county. Since eligibility for a local health insurance
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account is often tied with a local hukou, many migrants can enroll in a health
insurance scheme only at their place of birth, and not at their place of work
or residence. This poor portability and transferability of health insurance
across regions leads us to formulate our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Compared to local residents, migrants benefit less from
health insurance.
China has a weak primary care system, with its healthcare dominated
by hospitals. Recent reforms have increased government funding for building
community health centers (CHCs) in cities and township hospitals and village
clinics (VCs) in rural areas (Bhattacharyya et al., 2011; Yip et al., 2012),
but there is still a lack of well-trained personnel on the supply side as well
as public trust on the demand side of the primary care system (Liu et al.,
2011; Mossialos et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2011). The weak primary care
system leads to heavy reliance on hospitals for both inpatient and outpatient
services. One common feature of the three health insurance schemes is the
variance in reimbursement rates by healthcare facility, with more generous
reimbursement for visits to lower-level facilities (Wang et al., 2012). This
provides an incentive for people to visit primary care facilities, but it remains
a question whether this would incentivize people to switch from hospitals to
CHCs or VCs for basic care. To answer this question, we present our next
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Relative to the uninsured, insured patients are more likely
to use primary care institutions.
Pharmaceutical spending is a major component of healthcare expenditure
in China, more so for outpatient expenditure in recent years. Outpatients
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and inpatients generally have different reimbursement eligibility and rates for
pharmaceutical spending, with inpatient reimbursement being more generous
(Hu and Mossialos, 2016; Mossialos et al., 2016). Drugs dispensed in outpa-
tient services are often subject to low reimbursement ceiling or not eligible
for reimbursement at all. In addition to the above hypotheses on total OOP
spending, we examine how pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical compo-
nents of OOP spending are associated with health insurance by testing the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 Health insurance is associated with lower OOP pharma-
ceutical spending.
3 Data
We draw our data from the 2011 and 2013 waves of the CHARLS, a survey
of a representaive sample of individuals aged 45 or above in China. Ethi-
cal approval is not applicable in our study as we use anonymized secondary
data. The CHARLS national survey, first conducted in 2011, covered 28
provinces, 150 counties/districts, and 450 villages/urban communities across
the country. A total of 17,708 individuals from around 10,000 households
were interviewed on a range of social, economic, and health circumstances.
A detailed description of this cohort can be found in Zhao et al. (2014a).
A follow-up wave was conducted in 2013 to track the changes in the same
respondents’ circumstances during the preceding two-year period, while in-
corporating a small share of new respondents, totaling 18,244. Around 81%
of the original 2011 sample participated in the follow-up survey in 2013, and
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those who dropped out were replaced with new respondents.
A major element of the survey is devoted to recording healthcare uti-
lization and health insurance status. The data provide information on the
type(s) of the respondents’ health insurance and whether the health insur-
ance account is managed locally. The data on healthcare utilization contain
detailed records on the last outpatient visit during the previous month and
last inpatient visit during the previous year. The survey also contains rich
information on demographic and socioeconomic status. Given its richness in
health-related information and the representativeness of its sample, CHARLS
is an ideal dataset to study how health insurance affects healthcare utilization
and OOP expenditure among the middle-aged and elderly in China, both on
a national scale and across different socioeconomic subgroups.
Although the data have a panel structure, only limited variation is found
in the status of health insurance across the two waves. Therefore, we pool
the two waves for our analysis. The pooled data contain 35,952 observations.
Our selected sample includes 32,387 individuals, making up 90.1% of the
full sample, after dropping those with lower age (2.0% are under age 45),
non-responses to healthcare related questions (5.5%), and covariates (1.9%),
and trimming off the top and bottom outliers (0.6% of the full sample, that
have OOP expenditures on/below the 1st percentile or on/above the 99th
percentile of the positive OOP expenditure distribution for outpatient or
inpatient care).
Our main outcomes are on outpatient and inpatient utilization and OOP
expenditures. Overall, the utilization rate of outpatient services during the
previous month is 18%, whereas the inpatient service utilization rate is about
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10% during the previous year. The survey records detailed healthcare spend-
ing for the last outpatient and inpatient visit, where the response rates exceed
95%. Detailed definitions for all variables are provided in Online Appendix
Table A2.
In our selected sample, 5.3% of individuals are not covered under any
health insurance. The descriptive summary by insurance status is avail-
able in Online Appendix Table A3. We divide the health insurance schemes
into four groups: UEBMI, URBMI, NCMS, and multiple/other insurances.
NCMS has the largest coverage by population (72% of the sample are insured
under this scheme), followed by UEBMI (11%) and URBMI (4%). Multi-
ple/other insurances cover the rest (7%). A small proportion (6%) of the
insured hold their insurance account outside the county/city where they live.
A simple comparison shows the insured more likely to use both outpatient
and inpatient services, and that they incur less OOP expenses for inpatient
services. We plot the distribution of outpatient and inpatient OOP spending
in Online Appendix Figure A1, conditional on utilization. From the figure,
OOP payments seem to be log-Gamma distributed with a left tail.
In terms of socioeconomic background and health status, the insured are
more likely to be male, rural, married and living with spouse, older, better
educated, working, less likely to be in good health or disabled, and more
likely to drink regularly and have chronic diseases. Their consumption does
not differ, although the insured are less likely to report consumption.
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4 Econometric Methods
4.1 Two-Part Model
We are interested in how health insurance is associated with OOP expendi-
ture. Health insurance may affect OOP expenditure through two channels.
First, health insurance may affect the probability of using healthcare ser-
vices. Second, conditional on the utilization of healthcare, the insured may
opt for a different level of care, thus incurring higher or lower OOP spend-
ing. We employ a two-part model (TPM) to address this. The first part
is a logit model with the binary outpatient or inpatient utilization variable
as the outcome, while the second part is a generalized linear model (GLM)
with gamma error distribution and a log link function. We control for the
provincial fixed effects to account for the variation across provinces in terms
of economic development, public health infrastructure, and health resources.
In addition, we cluster the standard errors at the county level to allow for
any arbitrary correlation of unobservable factors within the administrative
boundary of the local healthcare authority.
Participation in health insurance could be endogenous, in that individuals
and households self-select into insurance. However, this is unlikely a major
concern in our setting. Enrollment in UEBMI is mandatory for formal-sector
employees. Although both URBMI and NCMS are voluntary schemes, they
are designed to alleviate the selection issue by taking enrollment at the house-
hold level. While our results cannot be interpreted as causal effects, in our
setting, the majority are covered by health insurance, making it more inter-
esting to uncover the heterogeneity in the association between health insur-
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ance and healthcare outcomes across different socioeconomic subgroups. We
apply the TPM to various subsamples by consumption and resident status to
find out how the potential benefits from health insurance might differ across
these subgroups.
4.2 Quantile Regression
Besides examining how health insurance affects the average OOP spending,
we are also interested in how it affects different parts of the distribution of
OOP spending. The association between health insurance and OOP spending
may be quite different for the light users faced with low healthcare costs and
the heavy users faced with high costs. Quantile regression can provide this
capability. We run a series of quantile regressions at the 0.1–0.9 quantiles of
OOP spending to provide a fuller picture of how health insurance is correlated
with OOP spending.
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Overall Effect
First, we examine the overall effect of health insurance coverage on health-
care utilization and OOP expenditures. These results are reported in Table 1.
Throughout the analysis, we consider the effect of health insurance on outpa-
tient and inpatient healthcare OOP expenditures separately for two reasons.
First, health insurance can have different effects on these two OOP compo-
nents; second, the data do not provide an overall measure of all healthcare
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expenditures, but instead give the OOP payment of the last outpatient and
inpatient visit.
In Panel A, the main variable of interest is having health insurance or not.
Column (1) shows that having health insurance significantly increases the
probability of using outpatient care by 3.8 percentage points from a baseline
of 14.5%. Meanwhile, column (2) shows that overall health insurance does
not significantly change the OOP expenditure per visit for outpatient care.
As for inpatient care, the estimates present a different pattern. While
column (3) shows that health insurance increases the probability of using
inpatient healthcare, column (4) demonstrates that the inpatient OOP ex-
penditure per visit is significantly reduced by 27%.
Panel B provides more detailed results by breaking down the insurance
variable into four categories: UEBMI, URBMI, NCMS, and multiple/other
insurances. The results suggest that while the different health insurance
schemes may affect healthcare outcomes in the same direction, the signifi-
cance and magnitude could be different. For utilization, all insurance schemes
except URBMI lead to significantly higher utilization rates; but for OOP ex-
penditure, different schemes lead to varying outcomes: only URBMI increases
outpatient OOP expenditure, while all schemes except NCMS decrease in-
patient OOP expenditure.
These differential effects on inpatient and outpatient OOP spending are
consistent with the design of the insurance schemes. All the three insurance
schemes prioritize the coverage for inpatient services, while the reimburse-
ment for outpatient services is either capped at a low amount or not available
at all. In addition, the results also highlight the different depths of coverage
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across the schemes, with urban schemes apparently offering better financial
protection for inpatient OOP expenditure than the rural NCMS.
Overall, our results show that China’s health insurances have been at
least partly effective in boosting healthcare utilization and offering finan-
cial protection against OOP spending for inpatient services. Our results
are consistent with earlier findings that health insurances increase access to
healthcare. Our finding on OOP spending is somewhat different from the
evidence of earlier studies (for instance, Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008; Yip
and Hsiao, 2009), but is more in line with more recent studies (for instance,
Jung and Streeter, 2015). Besides the differences in data and methodologies
used, the time scopes of the studies could also be a reason for these different
findings. More recent data seem to support the view that China has been
progressing toward a better healthcare system, particularly since its recent
reforms in 2009.
5.2 Heterogeneity
In addition to the overall effect, we are further interested in how OOP spend-
ing and health insurance are associated in different ways for different sub-
groups. Figure 1 plots the proportion of OOP payment in the per capita
household consumption by insurance status for the last outpatient and in-
patient visits across quintiles of per capita household consumption. We find
the gap between the insured and uninsured much larger at the lower parts of
the consumption distribution. This graphical evidence suggests that health
insurance offers financial protection mainly for low- and medium-income in-
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dividuals.
In Table 2, we test this implication by running a subgroup analysis across
the consumption distribution. We split the sample into three subgroups by
terciles of per capita household consumption, and run separate regressions
on these subgroups. The results show that low and medium subgroups drive
the overall results. For low- and medium-consumption individuals, health
insurance is significantly associated with higher outpatient and inpatient uti-
lization, and higher outpatient and lower inpatient OOP spending. For those
with high consumption, none of the associations are statistically significant.
The breakdown results by insurance scheme are available in Online Appendix
Table A4.
The above analysis focuses on how health insurance affects OOP expen-
diture at the mean, although there may be differential effects across the
OOP spending distribution. This is directly related to the depth of insur-
ance coverage, because a shallow coverage might buffer against lower health
expenditure, but might not protect the enrollees from catastrophic expendi-
ture. In addition, one potential problem with the above subsample analysis
is that the sample sizes are becoming smaller, which could lead to lower
statistical power. To address these issues, we turn to quantile regressions
to explore the heterogeneity in the association between OOP spending and
health insurance. We run a series of quantile regressions of OOP spending
on health insurance, each time focusing on one quantile, thus avoiding the
problem of stretching the data thinner as in the subgroup analysis approach.
The quantile regression results are presented in Table 3. For outpatient
services, health insurance reduces OOP spending at the 0.2 quantile, but does
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not significantly change the OOP spending for the rest of the distribution,
except for the 0.9 quantile, where insurance actually increases OOP spending.
A breakdown by insurance scheme reveals that NCMS (0.1 to 0.3 quantiles)
and multiple/other insurances (0.2 quantile) are effective in buffering against
small expenditures. However, all the schemes fail to ease the financial burden
of large outpatient OOP expenditures (0.4–0.9 quantiles), if they do not
increase it.
For inpatient care, health insurance reduces OOP spending at the lower
and medium quantiles (0.1 to 0.7). A comparison of the schemes suggests that
all schemes except NCMS reduce inpatient OOP spending across the whole
distribution. NCMS reduces inpatient spending up to the 0.7 quantile, but
fails to offer financial protection for very large inpatient OOP expenditure
at the 0.8 and 0.9 quantiles.
Our exploration of heterogeneity in the association between health insur-
ance and OOP spending shows that people with low and medium standards
of living benefit from lower inpatient OOP spending. From a policy perspec-
tive, this is encouraging, by pointing to reducing the inequity in healthcare.
However, the quantile regression results also highlight that health insurance
still does not offer adequate financial protection for some individuals faced
with the largest healthcare expenditure owing to two factors: first, outpa-
tient coverage is still limited; second, the largest scheme, NCMS, does not
offer enough protection from large hospitalization expenditure. These results
suggest that the shallow depth of coverage is one gap that needs to be filled
in China’s current health insurance schemes.
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5.3 Migrants
We next consider the potential heterogeneous effects by resident status. We
split the sample into urban residents, rural migrants, and rural residents,
and re-estimate the same TPM on these three subsamples. The descriptive
statistics are available in Online Appendix Table A5. Rural migrants are
better educated and more aﬄuent than rural residents, but they fall far
behind urban residents. Although they may work and live in urban areas,
most of them (80%) are on NCMS. They are much more likely (18%) to have
their health insurance account set up outside the city/county compared to
urban (6%) and rural (5%) residents. They are also more likely (12%) to
have no insurance at all compared to urban (8%) and rural (4%) residents.
From Table 4, the benefits that these three groups derive from health
insurance are vastly different. Urban residents (columns 1–4) enjoy the most
benefits from higher probability of using healthcare and lower inpatient OOP
spending, although a small group of urban residents under URBMI might
incur higher outpatient OOP spending. Rural residents (columns 9–12),
who are mostly on NCMS, mainly benefit from higher utilization rates for
both outpatient and inpatient services, but their OOP expenditures are not
lowered.
Migrants (columns 5–8) hardly benefit from health insurance even if they
have one. The only positive effect is that they are more likely to use outpa-
tient services if they have a local insurance account (this is mainly driven by
multiple/other insurances), but those whose accounts are set up elsewhere
have no such benefits. NCMS, the most likely option for migrants, has no
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effect on their healthcare utilization or OOP expenditure.
A plausible explanation for these distinctions between migrants and non-
migrants is the institutional barriers in the current health insurance system.
The public funding for insurance schemes is managed by local municipal-
ity/county governments to serve local residents; migrants often do not have
access to local social welfare, while they receive little or no reimbursement for
outside municipality/county healthcare services due to poor regional porta-
bility and transferability of the current health insurance system.
While China has made significant progress toward achieving near-universal
coverage, our results suggest that migrants have been left out, both in terms
of access to care and financial protection. On this front, the priority should be
to make health insurance more portable and transferable across geographic
regions, so that this particularly vulnerable socio-economic group can acquire
the benefits enjoyed by local residents.
5.4 Primary Care
The next question we explore is whether health insurance can incentivize
people to visit primary care facilities. This is a particularly important issue
in China, which relies heavily on hospitals to provide even the most basic
care (Liu et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2011).
Table 5 reports the average marginal probabilities of visiting different
types of healthcare providers, namely, CHCs/VCs, township hospitals, or
county/city hospitals from a multinomial logit estimation. For outpatient
care, the probability of insured patients visiting CHCs/VCs has not increased
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at all. UEBMI patients are in fact more likely to visit county/city hospitals
for outpatient care. For inpatient care, the probability of UEBMI and NCMS
patients visiting CHCs is higher, but CHCs make up only 3% of all inpatient
visits, and they are not designed for hospitalization, so although the coeffi-
cient is statistically significant, it is not economically significant. Rural areas
show a shift from higher-tier county/city hospitals to lower-tier township hos-
pitals; but in urban areas, UEBMI enrollees are more likely to switch from
lower-tier to higher-tier hospitals. Overall, the evidence suggests that the
incentive offered by health insurance schemes for patients to seek care from
a primary care facility is limited.
5.5 Pharmaceutical Spending
Pharmaceutical spending represents a significant share of OOP expenditure.
Indeed, the descriptive statistics show that the share of pharmaceutical ex-
penditure is more than two-thirds of the outpatient and roughly half of the
inpatient OOP expenditure. Hence, shedding more light on the pharmaceu-
tical expenditure/insurance nexus is important, particularly from a policy
point of view.
We divide OOP expenditures into pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical
spending, to investigate which component drives the effects of health in-
surance reducing OOP expenditure. From Table 6, health insurance has
not been effective in reducing either pharmaceutical or non-pharmaceutical
OOP spending for outpatient care. In fact, insurance leads to higher non-
pharmaceutical OOP spending except for UEBMI enrollees. For inpatient
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care, all schemes reduce OOP pharmaceutical spending, but only urban
schemes reduce OOP non-pharmaceutical spending, again highlighting the
shallower NCMS coverage.
These results suggest that health insurance coverage should be extended
for outpatient services, especially for drugs. Under the current schemes, pa-
tients have to rely on inpatient services to obtain reimbursable drugs, putting
further pressure on the already overcrowded hospitals. Given the increasing
pharmaceutical spending on outpatient care (Mossialos et al., 2016), it seems
more important now than ever before to expand the coverage for outpatient
care.
5.6 Limitations
It is important to note that our study has its limitations. First, the data used
are self-reported survey data, which could suffer from measurement error.
Second, our results cannot be interpreted as causal, although self-selection is
unlikely to be a major concern in our setting. Third, we do not investigate
how the association between health insurance and OOP spending changes
over time, as we only have two waves of data that are not sufficiently far
apart in time. However, more waves of CHARLS data will become available
for future research to track the changes over time.
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, our analysis using recent CHARLS data shows that China’s
health insurance schemes have been partly effective. For the middle-aged
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and elderly, insurance is generally associated with a considerable reduction
in OOP expenditure for inpatient services, but with no reduction for outpa-
tient OOP spending. In some cases, outpatient OOP spending even increases.
Next, we also find the benefits distributed unevenly. Across the consump-
tion distribution, individuals with low and medium standards of living are the
main beneficiaries. Furthermore, those with very high medical bills are still
at risk because of the limited coverage for outpatient services and shallower
coverage of NCMS for inpatient care. Third, a comparison of the migrants
and non-migrants shows that migrants hardly benefit from health insurance.
They still face strong institutional barriers to the social welfare benefits en-
joyed by local residents. Fourth, health insurance has not been effective in
encouraging people to seek care from primary healthcare facilities; hospitals
are still the main healthcare provider in the delivery of healthcare, although
NCMS does shift some inpatient visits from higher-tier to lower-tier hospi-
tals. Finally, OOP spending on pharmaceuticals is reduced for inpatient care
but not for outpatient care, suggesting that people have to rely on inpatient
care to obtain reimbursable drugs, putting further pressure on overcrowded
hospitals.
Our analysis presents evidence that China’s health insurance system has
been effective in boosting healthcare utilization and alleviating the finan-
cial burden of individuals facing hospitalization, especially those with low
and medium income. However, our findings also shed light on several areas
where challenges remain, owing to the less generous rural NCMS scheme,
shallow outpatient care coverage, lack of portability of insurance benefits for
migrants, and an underdeveloped primary healthcare system.
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Table 1: The overall effect of health insurance on healthcare utilization and
out-of-pocket expenditures: two-part model results
Last outpatient visit Last inpatient visit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Util. OOP Util. OOP
Logit GLM Logit GLM
Panel A
Insurance 0.038∗∗∗ 0.140 0.036∗ −0.266∗∗
(0.013) (0.209) (0.020) (0.119)
Panel B
UEBMI 0.069∗∗∗ 0.133 0.051∗∗ −0.386∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.231) (0.021) (0.140)
URBMI 0.021 0.451∗∗ 0.021 −0.378∗∗
(0.022) (0.220) (0.025) (0.161)
NCMS 0.032∗ 0.115 0.033∗ −0.181
(0.017) (0.204) (0.019) (0.113)
Multiple/Other 0.045∗∗∗ 0.086 0.037∗ −0.379∗∗∗
insurances (0.014) (0.282) (0.021) (0.144)
N 32,387 5,889 32,387 3,119
Notes Average marginal effects (probabilities) are reported for logit models,
whereas coefficients are reported for GLM models. Clustered standard errors
at the county level are in parentheses. Sampling weights are applied in all
models to obtain the estimates. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All the covariates in Online Appendix
Table A2 and provincial fixed effects are controlled for but not reported here.
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Figure 1: Share of outpatient and inpatient OOP spending out of
per capita household consumption across the consumption
distribution
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Table 2: Heterogeneous effects of health insurance across terciles of per
capita household consumption
Terciles of consumption
Low Medium High
Panel A: Outpatient utilization, logit
Insurance 0.010 0.073∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.018) (0.022) (0.032)
N 10,353 10,334 10,337
Panel B: Outpatient OOP spending, GLM
Insurance 0.461∗∗∗ 0.115 −0.385
(0.171) (0.192) (0.468)
N 1,816 1,920 1,962
Panel C: Inpatient utilization, logit
Insurance 0.031∗ 0.026 0.039
(0.017) (0.018) (0.041)
N 10,323 10,315 10,337
Panel D: Inpatient OOP spending, GLM
Insurance −0.511∗∗ −0.342∗ −0.195
(0.201) (0.196) (0.209)
N 877 1,005 1,091
Notes
Sampling weights are applied in all models to obtain the esti-
mates. Average marginal effects (probabilities) are reported
for logit models, whereas coefficients are reported for GLM
models. Clustered standard errors at the county level are in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All the covariates in
Online Appendix Table A2 and provincial fixed effects are
controlled for but not reported here.
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Table 3: Quantile effects of health insurance on OOP expenditures
Quantile
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Panel A: Outpatient OOP expenditure, N = 5, 889
Insurance −0.254 −0.286** −0.132 0.012 −0.054 −0.074 −0.043 0.201 0.453***
(0.142) (0.106) (0.083) (0.101) (0.186) (0.119) (0.103) (0.108) (0.136)
Panel B: Outpatient OOP expenditure, N = 5, 889
UEBMI 0.047 −0.273 −0.076 0.039 −0.022 −0.020 0.188 0.310 0.692***
(0.156) (0.164) (0.177) (0.170) (0.208) (0.173) (0.175) (0.161) (0.209)
URBMI −0.095 −0.243 0.096 0.245 0.228 0.156 0.278 0.442** 0.780**
(0.179) (0.201) (0.204) (0.193) (0.201) (0.177) (0.177) (0.163) (0.270)
NCMS −0.300* −0.271** −0.186* −0.041 −0.048 −0.147 −0.069 0.102 0.364*
(0.136) (0.099) (0.080) (0.103) (0.158) (0.126) (0.100) (0.099) (0.152)
Multiple/Other −0.235 −0.311* −0.107 −0.036 −0.047 −0.118 −0.049 0.262 0.703**
insurances (0.185) (0.155) (0.155) (0.160) (0.195) (0.172) (0.163) (0.203) (0.238)
Panel C: Inpatient OOP expenditure, N = 3, 119
Insurance −0.786* −0.758***−0.713***−0.522***−0.514** −0.432** −0.363* −0.279 −0.433
(0.311) (0.162) (0.115) (0.153) (0.158) (0.164) (0.184) (0.212) (0.266)
Panel D: Inpatient OOP expenditure, N = 3, 119
UEBMI −0.711∗ −0.720∗∗∗ −0.770∗∗∗ −0.608∗∗∗ −0.647∗∗∗ −0.644∗∗∗ −0.752∗∗∗ −0.716∗∗∗ −0.782∗∗∗
(0.388) (0.197) (0.147) (0.187) (0.185) (0.180) (0.182) (0.197) (0.233)
URBMI −0.820∗∗ −0.776∗∗∗ −0.688∗∗∗ −0.535∗∗∗ −0.604∗∗∗ −0.521∗∗ −0.516∗∗ −0.423∗ −0.630∗∗∗
(0.398) (0.246) (0.160) (0.196) (0.200) (0.222) (0.220) (0.222) (0.241)
NCMS −0.812∗∗ −0.753∗∗∗ −0.686∗∗∗ −0.501∗∗∗ −0.484∗∗∗ −0.369∗∗ −0.286∗ −0.261 −0.218
(0.356) (0.159) (0.125) (0.172) (0.167) (0.156) (0.169) (0.168) (0.200)
Multiple/Other −0.800∗∗ −0.792∗∗∗ −0.776∗∗∗ −0.593∗∗∗ −0.614∗∗∗ −0.584∗∗∗ −0.585∗∗∗ −0.464∗∗ −0.554∗∗
insurances (0.396) (0.230) (0.155) (0.197) (0.179) (0.174) (0.188) (0.193) (0.215)
Notes Clustered standard errors at the county level are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 0.01,
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All the covariates in Online Appendix Table A2 and provincial fixed effects are controlled
for but not reported here.
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Table 5: Average marginal probabilities of visiting different types of
healthcare providers: Multinomial logit model results
Last outpatient visit Last inpatient visit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CHC Township County/City CHC Township County/City
VC hospital hospital hospital hospital
Panel A
Insurance −0.005 0.022 −0.017 0.055∗ 0.158∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.026) (0.043) (0.030) (0.067) (0.072)
Panel B
UEBMI −0.010 −0.098∗∗ 0.108∗∗ 0.057∗ −0.235∗∗ 0.178∗
(0.056) (0.042) (0.049) (0.033) (0.095) (0.091)
URBMI 0.018 −0.087∗ 0.069 0.049 −0.104 0.056
(0.060) (0.045) (0.053) (0.034) (0.091) (0.098)
NCMS 0.016 0.043 −0.060 0.059∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.028) (0.049) (0.030) (0.060) (0.065)
Multiple/Other −0.028 −0.020 0.048 0.047 0.082 −0.129
insurances (0.051) (0.039) (0.039) (0.034) (0.073) (0.081)
N 5,889 5,889 5,889 3,119 3,119 3,119
% outcome = 1 44.63 16.48 38.89 2.95 17.95 79.11
Notes Clustered standard errors at the county level are in parentheses. Sampling weights are applied in all
models to obtain the estimates. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively. All the covariates in Online Appendix Table A2 and provincial fixed effects are controlled for
but not reported here.
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Table 6: Health insurance and OOP pharmaceutical and
non-pharmaceutical spending
Last outpatient visit Last inpatient visit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total OOP OOP Total OOP OOP
OOP pharma. non-pharma. OOP pharma. non-pharma.
spending spending spending spending spending spending
GLM GLM GLM GLM GLM GLM
Panel A
Insurance 0.140 −0.212 0.637∗∗ −0.266∗∗ −0.648∗∗∗ −0.290
(0.209) (0.343) (0.294) (0.119) (0.244) (0.263)
Panel B
UEBMI 0.133 −0.171 0.396 −0.386∗∗∗ −0.730∗∗ −0.638∗∗
(0.231) (0.401) (0.304) (0.140) (0.305) (0.272)
URBMI 0.451∗∗ 0.100 0.992∗∗∗ −0.378∗∗ −0.542∗ −0.662∗
(0.220) (0.352) (0.321) (0.161) (0.289) (0.352)
NCMS 0.115 −0.227 0.633∗ −0.181 −0.646∗∗∗ 0.042
(0.204) (0.328) (0.327) (0.113) (0.246) (0.276)
Multiple/Other 0.086 −0.377 0.628∗∗ −0.379∗∗∗ −0.642∗∗ −0.255
insurances (0.282) (0.420) (0.287) (0.144) (0.275) (0.331)
N 5,889 5,115 5,115 3,119 1,678 1,678
Notes Clustered standard errors at the county level are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statis-
tical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The sample sizes in columns (2), (3), (5),
and (6) are smaller due to missing values. Valid zero spending is recoded to 1 RMB. All covariates in
the Online Appendix Table A2 and provincial fixed effects are controlled for but not reported here.
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A Online Appendix
Table A1: Summary of China’s health insurance schemes as of 2010
UEBMI URBMI NCMS
Year launched 1998 2008 2003
Target population Formal sector
urban employees
Urban residents
without formal
employment and
some migrants
Rural residents
and some
migrants
% Enrolment 92% 93% 97%
Risk pool unit City County County
Central gov. subsidy None 120 RMB (19
USD) per person
120 RMB (19
USD)
Minimum local gov.
subsidy
6% payroll tax
levied on
employers
60 RMB (9 USD) 60 RMB (9
USD)
Individual contribution 2% wages 20–250 RMB (3–38
USD)
20–50 RMB
(3–8 USD)
Total premium per person 1,560 RMB (240
USD)
140 RMB (22
USD)
160 RMB (25
USD)
Inpatient reimburse rate1 68% 48% 44%
Outpatient coverage Yes, via
personal MSA
In some counties In some counties
Total reimbursement
ceiling
Six-times
average wage of
employees in the
city
Six-times
disposable income
of local residents
Six-times
income of local
farmers
1 % total inpatient expenditure reimbursed by insurance taking into account deductible,
copayment, and ceiling.
Source: Yip et al. (2012); Meng et al. (2015).
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Figure A1: The distributions of log OOP spending for the last
outpatient and inpatient visit
Notes: Kernel density is estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel-weight function
with the optimal bandwidth that minimizes the mean integrated squared error.
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Table A2: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Health insurance
Insurance = 1 if policy holder or primary beneficiary of any of
the types of listed health insurance, = 0 if no
insurance
No insurance = 1 if not policy holder or primary beneficiary of
any of the types of listed health insurance, = 0 if any
insurance
UEBMI = 1 if only insurance is UEBMI, = 0 otherwise
URBMI = 1 if only insurance is URBMI, = 0 otherwise
NCMS = 1 if only insurance is NCMS, = 0 otherwise
Multiple/Other
insurances
= 1 if policy holder or primary beneficiary of more
than one type of listed health insurance, or policy
holder or primary beneficiary of any insurance other
than UEBMI, URBMI, and NCMS (including Urban
and Rural Resident Medical Insurance, Government
Medical Insurance, medical aid, private medical
insurance purchased by the respondent’s union,
private medical insurance purchased by the
respondent, Urban Non-Employed Person’s Health
Insurance, and other medical insurance), = 0
otherwise
Local insurance = 1 if health insurance account/policy was set up
within this county/city, = 0 otherwise
Elsewhere insurance = 1 if health insurance account/policy was set up
outside this county/city, = 0 otherwise
Last outpatient visit in the last month
Utilization = 1 if having visited a public hospital, private
hospital, public health center, clinic, or health
worker’s or doctor’s practice, or been visited by a
health worker or doctor for outpatient care in the
last month, = 0 if not
Continued on next page . . .
34
. . . continued from previous page
Variable Definition
OOP expenditure The OOP amount paid for this visit, after
reimbursement from insurance
Share of OOP in
consumption
OOP expenditure divided by per capita household
consumption
OOP pharmaceutical
spending
The OOP amount paid for medications from this
visit (including prescriptions received). Zero amount
recoded to 1 RMB.
OOP
non-pharmaceutical
spending
OOP expenditure minus OOP pharmaceutical
spending. Zero amount recoded to 1 RMB.
Share of
pharmaceutical
spending
OOP pharmaceutical spending divided by OOP
expenditure
Community health
center/village clinic
= 1 if the last health facility visited for outpatient
care is a community healthcare center, a Healthcare
post, or a village/private clinic, = 0 otherwise
Township hospital = 1 if the last health facility visited for outpatient
care is a township hospital, = 0 otherwise
County/City
hospital
= 1 if the last health facility visited for outpatient
care is a general hospital, a specialized hospital, or a
Chinese medicine hospital, = 0 otherwise
Last inpatient visit in the last month
Utilization = 1 if having received inpatient care in the past
year, = 0 if not
OOP expenditure The OOP amount paid (or will be paid) for this visit
Share of OOP in
consumption
OOP expenditure divided by per capita household
consumption
OOP pharmaceutical
spending
The OOP amount paid for medications from this
visit
Continued on next page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
Variable Definition
OOP
non-pharmaceutical
spending
OOP expenditure minus OOP pharmaceutical
spending
Share of
pharmaceutical
spending
OOP pharmaceutical spending divided by OOP
expenditure
Community health
center
= 1 if the last health facility visited for inpatient
care is a community healthcare center, or a
Healthcare post, = 0 otherwise
Township hospital = 1 if the last health facility visited for inpatient
care is a township hospital, = 0 otherwise
County/City
hospital
= 1 if the last health facility visited for inpatient
care is a general hospital, a specialized hospital, or a
Chinese medicine hospital, = 0 otherwise
Covariates
Female =1 if female, = 0 if male
Rural resident =1 if living in a rural village, = 0 otherwise
Migrant =1 if living in a urban community and have a rural
hukou, = 0 otherwise
Urban resident =1 if living in a urban community and have a urban
hukou
Living with spouse = 1 if married and living with spouse, = 0 otherwise
Not living with
spouse
= 1 if married but not living with spouse
temporarily, = 0 otherwise
Not married = 1 if separated, divorced, widowed, or never
married, = 0 otherwise
Age 45∼55 = 1 if age≥ 45 and age< 55, = 0 otherwise
Age 55∼65 = 1 if age≥ 55 and age< 65, = 0 otherwise
Age ≥65 = 1 if age≥ 65, = 0 otherwise
Continued on next page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
Variable Definition
Education below
primary
= 1 if no formal education, or did not finish primary
school, = 0 otherwise
Education primary = 1 if home school or highest education level is
primary school, = 0 otherwise
Education middle
school
= 1 if highest education level is middle school, = 0
otherwise
Education high
school+
= 1 if highest education level is or above high school,
= 0 otherwise
Working = 1 if have engaged in agricultural work (including
farming, forestry, fishing, and husbandry for own
family or others) for more than 10 days in the past
year, or have worked for at least one hour last week,
or currently on leave from work but expect to return
to job within 6 months, = 0 otherwise
Good health = 1 if self-rated health is excellent, very good, or
good
Fair health = 1 if self-rated health is fair, = 0 otherwise
Bad health = 1 if self-rated health is poor or very poor, = 0
otherwise
Current smoker = 1 if current smoker, = 0 otherwise
Former smoker = 1 if not currently smoking but used to smoke, = 0
otherwise
Never smoked = 1 if never smoked, = 0 otherwise
Drinking = 1 if drink alcoholic beverages more than once a
month, = 0 otherwise
Disabled = 1 if have any of the listed disabilities (physical
disabilities, brain damage/mental retardation, vision
loss, hearing loss, speech impediment), = 0 if none
Chronic disease = 1 if diagnosed with any of the 14 listed chronic
diseases, = 0 otherwise
Continued on next page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
Variable Definition
Chronic disease
missing
= 1 if missing response for diagnoses, = 0 otherwise
Log per capita
consumption
Logarithm of annualized household consumption
(excluding medical expenditure) divided by number
of household members. Annualized household
consumption is calculated as the sum of the
following: spending on food (including home-grown
food), eating out, alcohol and tobacco in the last
week, multiplied by 52; spending on 7 listed items
(communication, water and electricity, fuels,
maids/housekeepers/servants, household items and
personal toiletries, and entertainment) in the last
month, multiplied by 12; and spending on 13 other
listed items (clothing and bedding, travelling
expenses, heating, furniture and durable goods,
education and training, fitness, beauty,
transportation and telecommunication, taxes and
government fees, automobiles, electronics, property
management, and donations) in the last year. This
variable is recoded to 0 for those without valid
reporting of consumption data, while a binary
variable “consumption missing” (see below) is also
included in the estimation.
Consumption
missing
=1 if no valid data on consumption, = 0 otherwise.
Year 2011 = 1 if wave of data is 2011, = 0 otherwise
Year 2013 = 1 if wave of data is 2013, = 0 otherwise
Notes: All monetary measures are deflated to 2011 RMB.
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Table A3: Summary statistics
Insured Uninsured Difference Total
(94.7%) (5.3%)
mean mean mean mean
(s.d.) (s.d.) (s.e.) (s.d.)
Insurance
UEBMI 0.11 0.11
(0.32) (0.31)
URBMI 0.05 0.04
(0.21) (0.21)
NCMS 0.77 0.72
(0.42) (0.45)
Multiple/Other insurances 0.07 0.07
(0.26) (0.25)
Local insurance 0.94 0.89
(0.24) (0.32)
Elsewhere insurance 0.06 0.06
(0.24) (0.24)
Last outpatient visit in the last month
Utilization 0.18 0.13 0.05∗∗∗ 0.18
(0.39) (0.34) (0.01) (0.39)
OOP expenditure (N = 5, 889) 390 323 67 388
(816) (615) (55) (810)
OOP pharmaceutical spending 183 156 27 182
(N = 5, 115) (398) (392) (29) (398)
OOP non-pharmaceutical 174 170 4 174
spending (N = 5, 115) (570) (461) (41) (566)
Share of pharma. spending in 0.68 0.69 0.00 0.68
OOP expenditure (N = 5, 115) (0.39) (0.40) (0.03) (0.39)
Community health center/ 0.46 0.53 −0.07∗∗ 0.46
village clinic (N = 5, 889) (0.50) (0.50) (0.03) (0.50)
Township hospital 0.19 0.15 0.03 0.19
(N = 5, 889) (0.39) (0.36) (0.03) (0.39)
Continued on next page . . .
39
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Insured Uninsured Difference Total
(94.7%) (5.3%)
mean mean mean mean
(s.d.) (s.d.) (s.e.) (s.d.)
County/City hospital 0.35 0.32 0.03 0.35
(N = 5, 889) (0.48) (0.47) (0.03) (0.48)
Last inpatient visit in the last 12 months
Utilization 0.10 0.05 0.05∗∗∗ 0.10
(0.30) (0.22) (0.01) (0.30)
OOP expenditure (N = 3, 119) 4,082 5,593 −1,511∗∗ 4,123
(6,237) (7,057) (692) (6,264)
OOP pharmaceutical spending 1,621 2,241 −620 1,641
(N = 1, 678) (3,395) (2,980) (464) (3,383)
OOP non-pharmaceutical 2,361 3492.81 −1,132∗ 2,398
spending (N = 1, 678) (4,827) (6,860) (673) (4908)
Share of pharma. spending in 0.48 0.47 0.00 0.48
OOP expenditure (N = 1, 678) (0.38) (0.39) (0.05) (0.38)
Community health center 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03
(N = 3, 119) (0.18) (0.11) (0.02) (0.18)
Township hospital 0.21 0.08 0.13∗∗∗ 0.21
(N = 3, 119) (0.41) (0.28) (0.04) (0.41)
County/City hospital 0.75 0.90 −0.15∗∗∗ 0.76
(N = 3, 119) (0.43) (0.30) (0.05) (0.43)
Covariates
Female 0.51 0.54 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.51
(0.50) (0.50) (0.01) (0.50)
Rural resident 0.73 0.55 0.18∗∗∗ 0.72
(0.45) (0.50) (0.01) (0.45)
Rural migrant 0.06 0.14 −0.08∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.23) (0.34) (0.01) (0.24)
Urban resident 0.21 0.32 −0.10∗∗∗ 0.22
(0.41) (0.47) (0.01) (0.41)
Continued on next page . . .
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Insured Uninsured Difference Total
(94.7%) (5.3%)
mean mean mean mean
(s.d.) (s.d.) (s.e.) (s.d.)
Living with spouse 0.82 0.71 0.11∗∗∗ 0.81
(0.39) (0.46) (0.01) (0.39)
Not living with spouse 0.06 0.07 −0.01∗∗ 0.06
(0.24) (0.26) (0.01) (0.24)
Not married 0.12 0.22 −0.10∗∗∗ 0.13
(0.33) (0.41) (0.01) (0.33)
Age 45∼55 0.34 0.36 −0.02∗∗ 0.34
(0.47) (0.48) (0.01) (0.47)
Age 55∼65 0.38 0.34 0.03∗∗∗ 0.37
(0.48) (0.47) (0.01) (0.48)
Age ≥ 65 0.29 0.30 −0.01 0.29
(0.45) (0.46) (0.01) (0.45)
Education below primary 0.44 0.51 −0.07∗∗∗ 0.45
(0.50) (0.50) (0.01) (0.50)
Education primary 0.22 0.20 0.02∗ 0.22
(0.41) (0.40) (0.01) (0.41)
Education middle school 0.21 0.19 0.03∗∗ 0.21
(0.41) (0.39) (0.01) (0.41)
Education high school+ 0.13 0.10 0.02∗∗∗ 0.13
(0.33) (0.30) (0.01) (0.33)
Working 0.68 0.60 0.08∗∗∗ 0.68
(0.47) (0.49) (0.01) (0.47)
Good health 0.24 0.27 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.24
(0.43) (0.44) (0.01) (0.43)
Fair health 0.48 0.44 0.04∗∗∗ 0.48
(0.50) (0.50) (0.01) (0.50)
Poor health 0.28 0.29 −0.01 0.28
(0.45) (0.45) (0.01) (0.45)
Never smoker 0.58 0.59 −0.01 0.58
Continued on next page . . .
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Insured Uninsured Difference Total
(94.7%) (5.3%)
mean mean mean mean
(s.d.) (s.d.) (s.e.) (s.d.)
(0.49) (0.49) (0.01) (0.49)
Current smoker 0.30 0.29 0.01 0.30
(0.46) (0.45) (0.01) (0.46)
Former smoker 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.12
(0.33) (0.32) (0.01) (0.33)
Drinking 0.26 0.23 0.04∗∗∗ 0.26
(0.44) (0.42) (0.01) (0.44)
Disabled 0.15 0.18 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.15
(0.36) (0.39) (0.01) (0.36)
Chronic disease 0.69 0.62 0.08∗∗∗ 0.69
(0.46) (0.49) (0.01) (0.46)
Chronic disease missing 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02
(0.13) (0.14) (0.00) (0.13)
Per capita consumption (N 6,094 5,779 315 6,078
= 31, 205 excluding missing) (8,457) (9,098) (218) (8,491)
Consumption missing 0.04 0.07 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.20) (0.26) (0.00) (0.20)
Year 2011 0.49 0.63 −0.14∗∗∗ 0.50
(0.50) (0.48) (0.01) (0.50)
Year 2013 0.51 0.37 0.14∗∗∗ 0.50
(0.50) (0.48) (0.01) (0.50)
N 30,661 1,726 32,387 32,387
Source: CHARLS 2011 and 2013.
Notes: All monetary measures are deflated to 2011 RMB. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statisti-
cal significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table A4: Heterogeneous effects of various health insurance
schemes across terciles of per capita household consumption
Terciles of consumption
Low Medium High
Panel A: Outpatient utilization, logit
UEBMI −0.068∗ 0.051 0.063∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.033) (0.021)
URBMI −0.040 0.078∗∗ −0.004
(0.031) (0.033) (0.039)
NCMS 0.021 0.078∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.019) (0.021) (0.045)
Multiple/Other insurances −0.017 0.054∗ 0.045∗∗
(0.026) (0.032) (0.021)
N 10,353 10,334 10,337
Panel B: Outpatient OOP spending, GLM
UEBMI 0.914∗∗∗ 0.306 −0.530
(0.318) (0.235) (0.500)
URBMI 0.508 0.461∗ −0.196
(0.363) (0.279) (0.464)
NCMS 0.432∗∗ −0.027 −0.309
(0.174) (0.209) (0.435)
Multiple/Other insurances 0.574∗∗ 0.362 −0.639
(0.289) (0.265) (0.545)
N 1,816 1,920 1,962
Panel C: Inpatient utilization, logit
UEBMI 0.030 0.035 0.055
(0.025) (0.023) (0.039)
URBMI 0.022 0.010 0.025
(0.028) (0.025) (0.047)
NCMS 0.032∗ 0.024 0.034
(0.017) (0.020) (0.040)
Multiple/Other insurances 0.034 0.033∗ 0.041
(0.021) (0.020) (0.044)
N 10,323 10,315 10,337
Panel D: Inpatient OOP spending, GLM
UEBMI −0.923∗∗∗ −0.586∗∗∗ −0.217
(0.308) (0.205) (0.263)
URBMI −1.012∗∗∗ −0.365 −0.319
(0.324) (0.245) (0.263)
NCMS −0.429∗∗ −0.178 −0.163
(0.199) (0.189) (0.202)
Multiple/Other insurances −0.241 −0.628∗∗∗ −0.374
(0.318) (0.230) (0.257)
N 877 1,005 1,091
Notes Sampling weights are applied in all models to obtain the estimates. Average
marginal effects (probabilities) are reported for logit models, whereas coefficients are re-
ported for GLM models. Clustered standard errors at the county level are in parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
All the covariates in Online Appendix Table A2 and provincial fixed effects are controlled
for but not reported here. 43
Table A5: Percentage distribution of variables across resident status
Percentages
Urban Rural Rural Total
residents migrants residents
% s.e. % s.e. % s.e. % s.e.
Insurance status
No insurance 7.71 (0.63) 11.58 (1.09) 4.06 (0.23) 5.33 (0.26)
UEBMI 46.08 (1.99) 2.32 (0.61) 0.74 (0.10) 10.79 (0.86)
URBMI 18.08 (1.20) 1.28 (0.41) 0.60 (0.22) 4.48 (0.44)
NCMS 11.52 (1.68) 79.65 (1.48) 90.50 (0.45) 72.49 (1.38)
Multiple/Other 16.60 (0.85) 5.17 (0.61) 4.10 (0.28) 6.91 (0.34)
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Insurance account location
No insurance 7.71 (0.63) 11.58 (1.09) 4.06 (0.23) 5.33 (0.26)
Local insurance 85.93 (0.74) 70.03 (1.95) 91.28 (0.46) 88.78 (0.45)
Elsewhere insurance 6.36 (0.51) 18.38 (1.62) 4.66 (0.40) 5.89 (0.35)
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Education level
Below primary 18.49 (1.06) 50.76 (1.90) 52.12 (0.95) 44.65 (0.96)
Primary 17.63 (0.80) 21.09 (1.35) 22.94 (0.56) 21.66 (0.48)
Middle school 28.14 (0.95) 21.00 (1.35) 18.84 (0.58) 21.02 (0.52)
High school+ 35.74 (1.40) 7.15 (0.81) 6.10 (0.30) 12.67 (0.61)
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Per capita household consumption
1st quintile 7.43 (0.71) 18.14 (1.36) 23.98 (0.74) 20.01 (0.67)
2nd quintile 11.09 (0.68) 17.83 (1.18) 22.93 (0.47) 20.03 (0.45)
3rd quintile 15.59 (0.65) 18.41 (0.98) 21.45 (0.39) 19.98 (0.36)
4th quintile 25.88 (0.82) 22.81 (1.19) 18.00 (0.48) 20.02 (0.44)
5th quintile 40.01 (1.63) 22.81 (1.45) 13.65 (0.56) 19.96 (0.75)
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
N 7,107 2,029 23,251 32,387
Notes This table reports the frequency distribution of certain variables in column percentages
across urban residents, rural migrants, and rural residents. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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